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AFIT/GE/ENG/09-04 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the impact of using three different rekeying protocols–pair-wise, 
hierarchical, and Secure Lock within a wireless sensor network (WSN) under the Hubenko 
architecture.  Using a Matlab computer simulation, the impact of the three rekeying protocols on 
the number of bits transmitted across the network and the amount of battery power consumed in 
WSN nodes during rekey operations is investigated.  
Baseline pair-wise rekeying performance can be improved by using either Secure Lock or 
hierarchical rekeying.  The best choice depends on the size of the WSN and the size of the key 
used.  Hierarchical rekeying is the best choice for networks with 500 or more nodes using a key 
size of 512 bits.  It is also the best choice for a network of 1,000 nodes using a 256-bit key.  For 
smaller networks with shorter key sizes, Secure Lock is the best choice.    
Overall, the number of bits transmitted for rekey operations can be reduced 3.32% to 
75.80% and the battery power savings range from 0.03% to 39.94% compared to pair-wise 
keying.  Based on the number of bits transmitted, the savings in battery power and the amount of 
memory required, hierarchical keying is clearly the best approach for network sizes of 1,000 
nodes or more utilizing a key with 128 bits or more in length.  For smaller network sizes, Secure 
Lock can be beneficial, but any savings over hierarchical keying are offset by the weaker 
security scheme and increased complexity of Secure Lock.   
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THE EVALUATION OF REKEYING PROTOCOLS WITHIN THE HUBENKO 
ARCHITECTURE AS APPLIED TO WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) began as a joint initiative between the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Intel, and the University of California, Berkeley 
to create an operating system specifically designed to enable these networks [Ten01].  Believing 
WSNs could one day revolutionize warfare, DARPA provided initial funding to create a 
specialized operating system for WSN devices called TinyOS.  Since then, the potential military 
applications of these tiny, wireless, networked sensor platforms have grown immensely.  The 
need to sense the environment, coupled with the ever diminishing size and cost of electronic 
devices has yielded the emergent technology of Wireless Sensor Networks.  As the cost of WSN 
devices decreases and their capabilities increase, the possible uses for WSNs are almost 
boundless.  However, since the battery life of WSN devices is limited, every WSN operation 
must be as efficient as possible.    
 To be of military value, WSNs must have secure communications; yet every processor 
instruction executed and every bit transmitted consumes battery power.  Preserving battery life is 
important since WSN nodes cease to operate once their batteries are consumed.  One promising 
power conservation approach incorporates the Hubenko architecture into the WSN.  Different 
rekeying protocols are evaluated based on the power consumption and efficiency in rekeying 
WSN nodes while maintaining the security of the entire WSN. 
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One use of WSNs is as a replacement for landmines.  In this application, the WSN nodes 
are outfitted with acoustic, pressure, or magnetic sensors.  Microphones detect the acoustic 
signature of approaching soldiers or equipment, while magnetic sensors could detect large 
metallic objects moving nearby, such as tanks, and pressure switches could detect if they are 
stepped on or run over.  If movement is detected, the WSN can alert friendly forces who can then 
choose how to respond – unlike a conventional landmine which would indiscriminately detonate.  
The response could vary from investigation by friendly forces, to artillery, missile, or aircraft fire 
on the area.  Once the area no longer needs to be monitored, the WSN nodes can be left behind 
since no lingering threat of buried explosives remain.  This eliminates the hazard of abandoned 
landmines in an area; a hazard that maims or kills hundreds of civilians every day around the 
world [ICB06]. 
1.2 Overview and Goals 
This research evaluates the performance of the Hubenko architecture using three different 
rekeying protocols in the context of a WSN under a variety of configurations.   
The goals of this research include: 
• Improve the efficiency of the rekeying operation within a WSN. 
• Investigate whether using hierarchical keying or Secure Lock [ChC89] provides 
measurable benefits. 
• Evaluate the impact of these rekeying protocols on the resource constrained nodes 
of a WSN.  
• Determine which rekeying protocol should be applied given particular network 
parameters, such as WSN size.  
 10
1.3 Experimental Approach 
 A computer simulation in Matlab is used to determine the impact of the three rekeying 
protocols using 144 combinations of factors with ten experimental runs each.  The simulation 
measures the number of bits transmitted at a central communications relay in the network for 
three different rekeying protocols-pair-wise, hierarchical, and Secure Lock for a simulated 
duration of 30 days.  In addition to the rekeying protocol, the size the network, the size of the 
key, the departure rate, and the rate of node mobility are varied across all combinations, resulting 
in 144 unique combinations.  Each factor combination of factors is replicated ten times. 
1.4 Thesis Layout 
This chapter introduces the research topic and the motivation for the effort.  In Chapter 2, 
background information and fundamental concepts are presented as well as recent work in the 
area.  Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to carry out the experiments.  Chapter 4 provides 
discussion and analysis of the experimental results.  Chapter 5 draws conclusions about the 
results and suggests areas for future research. 
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II. Background and Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents fundamental concepts and recent research in the areas of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Wireless Networks, Distributed Sensor Networks, securing wireless 
networks, multicasting technology, and secure, scalable multicast architectures.  Section 2.1 
introduces mobile ad hoc networks, followed by a discussion of wireless sensor networks in 
Section 2.2.  Section 2.3 defines UAVs, presents some typical UAV operational characteristics, 
the expanding need for UAVs in the battlespace, and some applications.  Section 2.4 presents 
multicasting.  Section 2.5 covers the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP), and Section 
2.6 discusses the group membership functions of Gothic.  Encryption techniques and key 
distribution techniques are discussed in Section 2.7.  Section 2.8 presents key management in 
multicast groups.  Section 2.9 presents the Hubenko architecture and experimental results from 
previous research.  Section 2.10 presents experimental research from adapting the Hubenko 
architecture to autonomous swarms of UAVs, along with experimental results.  Section 2.11 
summarizes the chapter. 
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) 
MANETs are:    
Self-configuring networks comprised of mobile nodes that adopt a completely 
arbitrary topology that can change rapidly and unpredictably.  In a fully 
distributed set up, the infrastructure lacks any centralized authenticator and uses 
distributed algorithms to support access control.  … Typical applications are 
rescue operations or tactical networks.  [FMA08] 
 
MANETs differentiate themselves from traditional networks by relying on no fixed 
infrastructure, such as base stations, access points, or remote servers [MDM07].  This allows ad 
hoc networks to be set up quickly and economically, which is advantageous in times of disaster 
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[MDM07].  MANET network devices self-organize into a multi-hop topology so packets can be 
relayed from one device to another across multiple nodes until they reach their destination 
[PPS08].  The challenge in creating the topology is to discover neighboring nodes close enough 
in proximity to maintain connectivity [PPS08].  One type of MANET of growing importance to 
the military is the wireless sensor network (WSN). 
2.2 Wireless Sensor Networks 
2.2.1 Overview 
Wireless sensor networks are typically ad hoc networks consisting of sensor devices 
limited in their transmission power and life span due to their fixed battery capacity [KMB07].  
Military interest in wireless sensor networks includes disposable networks of sensors that can 
detect and report an event of interest, such as troop or equipment movements [PST02, AMC07].   
The number of nodes in a sensor network can be orders of magnitude larger than in an ad 
hoc network, sensor networks are typically densely populated, sensor nodes are limited in 
capability, sensor nodes are prone to failure due to harsh operating environments and limited 
battery life, and sensor network topology changes frequently due to failures or the movement of 
sensor nodes [WAR06].   
Most deployed wireless sensor networks measure scalar physical data such as 
temperature, humidity, pressure or the location of objects.  These functions require relatively low 
bandwidth and are tolerant of network delays or congestion [AMC07].  However, as research 
extends the capabilities of wireless sensor networks, the potential uses of these networks have 
expanded to include capturing video, still photos, or audio clips [AMC07].  The data throughput 
requirement is much higher for these applications.   
 13
2.2.2 Wireless Sensor Network Nodes  
A typical wireless sensor node is very limited in resources such as battery power, 
processing power, and memory [CAA08].  Figure 1 shows a wireless sensor node, the Crossbow 
IRIS (slightly larger than its actual size).  To give a sense of the scale of the device, the bottom 
of the device houses two standard AA batteries.  This device has connectors for an interface 
expansion board and an external antenna connector.  Due to the limited capacity of the batteries, 
the transmission range and data rate capacity of the node is also limited.   
 
Figure 1.  Crossbow IRIS Wireless Sensor Node [Cro08] 
Table 1 shows the power consumption of the Crossbow IRIS in four different states.  The 
highest power consumption occurs when the radio transmitter is transmitting at 3 dBm.  When 
the node is not active and can be put to sleep, the power consumption drops by over three orders 
of magnitude to 8 microamps.  With the dual AA battery pack supplying 2.85 Amp-hours of 
power [Ene08], a node that continuously transmits can operate for less than 7 days, whereas a 
node in its sleep state can last up to a year [Cro08].  This shows the importance of power 
conservation in these devices and the impact putting a node to sleep can have on the lifespan of 
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the node.  Because the wireless transmitter is the largest consumer of energy in the node, great 
effort is taken to minimize the communications overhead and make all communications as 
efficient as possible [PST02].   
Table 1.  Power Consumption of Crossbow IRIS [Cro08] 
State Current Draw 
TX @ 3 dBm 17 mA 
RX 16 mA 
CPU active 8 mA 
Sleep 8 μA 
 
Wireless Sensor Node devices also have limited processing power and memory.  Table 2 
shows the capabilities of two typical wireless sensor nodes.  While a desktop computer may have 
a processor running at 3.4 GHz with 3 GB of memory, the Crossbow IRIS runs at 16 MHz and 
has 128 KB of non-volatile flash program memory.   
Table 2.  CPU and Memory Specifications of Crossbow Devices [Cro08] 
Device CPU Memory 
Mica 8 MHz 128 KB 
IRIS 16 MHz 128 KB 
2.2.3 Wireless Sensor Network Architecture 
Figure 2 shows a typical wireless sensor network architecture.  To enable WSN 
communications beyond the wireless sensor network, a gateway node is required.  The gateway 
node sits at the boundary and differs from the other nodes in that it typically has a larger battery, 
increased communications range, and the capability to communicate with other networks 
[PST02].  The gateway is the only device in the wireless sensor network with an IP address 
[Cro08].  Inside the wireless sensor network field, layer two MAC addressing is used to forward 
data frames [AMC07].  
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Figure 2 shows a small WSN field organized into a cluster.  Spatial clustering, which is 
described in more detail in Section 2.8.2, breaks up large networks into smaller, more 
manageable groups.  Each cluster has a cluster leader, which is like any other node in the 
network, but with the added responsibility of tracking cluster membership.  
GW 
CL
A
HGF
D
E
B
C
GW – Gateway
CL – Cluster LeaderIP Side of Network
WSN Side of Network
IP Network
End User
 
Figure 2.  Wireless Sensor Network Architecture 
Figure 2 illustrates how a message flows from a sensor to an end user.  Sensor G has 
something to report to the end user, such as temperature or perhaps the movement of a large 
metallic object nearby.  Sensor G determines the best path to the gateway and in this case, sends 
its message via node A to the cluster leader.  The cluster leader forwards the message to the 
network gateway, which forwards the message across the IP-based network to the end user. 
Since the nodes in a wireless sensor network are power limited, one way to extend the 
life of a WSN is to use a nearby communications asset to relay messages across the network to 
the end user.  For example, a gateway node required to communicate directly with a low earth 
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orbit satellite would quickly consume its battery in radio transmissions to the satellite due to the 
distance involved.  If the gateway node can use an intermediary, such as an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV), the gateway would use power and still achieve the required communications 
path since the distance to the UAV is much shorter.   
2.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
The DoD defines a UAV as: 
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic 
forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be 
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.  Ballistic 
or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not 
considered unmanned aerial vehicles.  [DoD08] 
 
UAVs were first used in military operations by the United States military during the 
Vietnam War [USA05].  More recently, UAVs were used in Operation ALLIED FORCE for 
bomb damage assessment while the aircraft performing the attack were still in the immediate 
area and available to strike again as needed [HaH03].   
2.3.1 Operational Characteristics 
Table 3 shows the operational limitations and characteristics of UAVs used by the United 
States Air Force (USAF) that could bridge the gap between a WSN and satellites.  These systems 
are designed with an overarching mission in mind and their characteristics are tailored to meet 
those primary mission requirements.  However, all of these UAVs have useful communications 
that could create a network that spans an area much larger than a single WSN field. 
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Table 3.  Operational Characteristics of UAVs [Gen 08, NoG07, USA08] 
Type 
Model Weight 
Max 
Speed Range Ceiling Endurance 
Series Name 
Primary 
Function (lbs) (mph) (mi) (1,000 ft) (hrs) 
MQ-1 Predator Armed Recon 1,130 135 454 25 24 
MQ-9 Reaper Armed Recon 4,900 230 3,682 50 30+ 
RQ-4 Global Hawk Reconnaissance 32,250 357 14,157 60+ 36 
 
2.3.2 Expansion of UAVs 
Since Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, research 
and acquisition dollars spent on UAVs has experienced huge growth.  The Teal Group projects 
that the United States will spend over $2.4 billion on UAV research and acquisition in FY 2008 
[TGC08].  UAV mission areas have expanded from short-term, short-range reconnaissance 
missions to: border patrol; detection of chemical, biological, or radiological materials; civilian 
search and rescue; environmental monitoring; weather data collection and more as their range, 
payload and sensor capabilities increase [USA05].  The United States Navy is considering a 
UAV system to provide Broad Area Maritime Surveillance [Jez08].  However, even with the vast 
expansion of UAV systems in use, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated the military is “too 
slow … to deliver more UAVs and other surveillance systems to Iraq and Afghanistan [Sch08].”  
Given the demand for these systems and the capabilities they provide, each must be used to its 
full capability. 
2.3.3 Emerging Operational Concepts 
The US military is looking for new ways to use UAVs to meet mission requirements.  
Instead of a traditional “stove-pipe” data link architecture, where all UAV sensor data is sent 
back to the US for analysis and dissemination, both the USAF and the Army are looking at ways 
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for UAVs to become a part of the regional data network so they can provide sensor data direct to 
the local users [Sch08].  This approach also has the advantage of providing other network 
services to users in the battlespace who cannot access the network through other means, such as 
isolated Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are small teams typically located far from any 
US military infrastructure [USA05].  The US Army is working on a handheld device that would 
allow soldiers to access classified and unclassified network data, which could eventually 
integrate into an expanded network provided by UAVs [Ian08].  This use of UAVs to expand 
network connectivity provides more opportunities for WSNs to use UAVs to provide sensor data 
to end users. 
2.4 Multicast Communications 
Efficiently routing messages through a network is another way to increase the endurance 
of WSN nodes, by reducing or eliminating redundant messages in the network.  Multicasting 
forwards a single message to select multiple recipients in different locations [SaM00].  Multicast 
differs from broadcasting in that it does not automatically forward a message to all connected 
nodes, but only to addressed recipients.  The advantage of multicasting is that a message 
intended for multiple users does not require a unique transmission from the source for each 
destination.  Without multicasting, the source has to send a copy of the message to each recipient 
individually.  With multicasting, the source sends one copy to the closest network node who, in 
turn, sends a copy to the addressed nodes they are connected to.  This decreases the bandwidth 
required to send the message and the time to send the message as shown in Figure 3.  On the left 
of the figure, the source must send out seven copies of the message; one for each destination in 
the network.  On the right, the network with multicasting sends only one copy of the message, 
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but the message propagates through the network, and is transmitted a total seven times; the 
intermediate routers take the copy they receive and transmit it to their subordinate nodes.  The 
key differences are that the source sends only one copy instead of seven and node A receives 
only one message and transmits two, whereas node 1 receives seven messages and transmits six.  
Nodes B and C realize similar savings over nodes 2 and 3.  Figure 3 is simplified slightly; it does 
not show any nodes not addressed in the message.  
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of Unicast to Multicast Communication 
2.5 Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) 
The basic building block of multicasting is IGMP [Ste94].  IGMP-capable routers 
provide multicast services by keeping a table of each group and its members.  When a router 
receives a packet destined for a group, the router uses the IGMP table to forward the packet 
across multiple links to all members in the group, except for the link the packet arrived on.   
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2.5.1 IGMP Operation 
There are two types of IGMP messages, and both are 8 bytes in length.  The Type 1 
IGMP message is the IGMP query sent by the router to the host.  A Type 2 message is a report 
sent from the host to the router.   
When a host joins an IGMP group, it sends a Type 2 report to the router containing the 
group address it wishes to join and its own IP address [Ste94].  This report is sent on the physical 
interface that the host wishes to receive the group messages on.  To reduce the risk of the router 
not receiving the first request, a second request is sent after a random interval of time elapses, 
between 0 and 10 seconds [Ste94].    
At unspecified regular intervals, the router sends Type 1 queries to all hosts in the 
multicast group [Ste94].  The hosts must respond with a Type 2 message to remain in the group.  
2.5.2 Limitation of IGMP  
While IGMP management of groups can save power by reducing or eliminating 
redundant transmissions, it is not intended to be a security mechanism.  A stealthy node in 
promiscuous mode can still receive group transmissions not intended for it, while remaining 
undetected.  For this reason, additional security measures must be used to secure the 
communications.    
 
2.6 Gothic Group Membership Authentication 
Knowing who is in the multicast network, allowing current users to leave, and providing 
means for new users to join are fundamental requirements for a secure multicast group.  
However, in a MANET with users entering and leaving the group, authenticating who is in the 
group is a challenge.  While IGMP can track who is in the group, IGMP permits any user who 
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wishes to join a group to do so without authentication.  A truly secure group must authenticate 
the members before they are permitted to join.  Gothic’s Group Access Control (GAC) [JuA02] 
is one approach to provide authenticated group membership. 
2.6.1 Gothic Operation 
Efficiently allowing users to join and to leave secure multicast groups is the objective of 
Gothic, a group access control architecture developed at the Georgia Institute of Technology 
[JuA02].  There are two key parts to Gothic: the GAC and the Group Key Management (GKM) 
system, which combine to form the Group Access Control Aware – Group Key Management 
(GACA-GKM) system.  The GAC controls group membership and is described here.  The GKM 
portion of Gothic is described in Section 2.8.1. 
The GAC interfaces with the network routers to ensure users do not have access before 
they are validated or after they depart the network.  Before a node is allowed to become a 
member of a group, GAC authenticates the user to ensure the user is authorized to join.  If 
authentication is successful, the node joins the group.   
2.6.2 Limitation  
While Gothic provides authenticated group membership, it is not a complete, standalone 
security solution.  It is easy for an eavesdropper to spoof a MAC address and receive all data 
intended for the group [Per08].  Gothic is also susceptible to the stealth eavesdropper attack 
described in Section 2.5.2.     
2.7 Encryption 
Encrypting communications for military operations is important to operational success.  
There are four desirable properties of secure communications: confidentiality, authentication, 
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non-repudiation, and availability [KuR05].  Confidentiality ensures only the sender and intended 
receiver can access the transmitted message.  Authentication validates the sender’s and receiver’s 
identities.  Availability keeps the system accessible to authorized users.  Non-repudiation ensures 
the sender of a message cannot deny sending it and assures the receiver that the message has not 
been modified since it was sent [KuR05].   
2.7.1 Encryption Techniques 
Encryption provides message confidentiality and is the basis for non-repudiation 
[KuR05].  There are two types of cryptographic systems: symmetric and asymmetric [MOV96].  
In a symmetric encryption system, a transmitter and receiver(s) share a common private key that 
is used to encrypt and decrypt the message.  While the key is symmetric, the network does not 
have to be.  That is, one message can be received and decrypted by multiple receivers as all 
participants use the same key.   
In an asymmetric encryption system, each user has a pair of keys.  One is used to encrypt 
the message, known as the public key.  The other is a private key that is used to decrypt the 
message.  The transmitter must have the recipient’s public key for the message to be successfully 
decrypted by the recipient’s private key.  For example, if Bob wants send a secure message to 
Alice, Bob uses Alice’s public key to encrypt his message to her.  Once Alice receives the 
message, she uses her private key to decrypt and read the message.  Once Bob encrypted the 
message with Alice’s key, only recipients who have access to Alice’s private key can decrypt the 
message.  Even Bob cannot decrypt the message that he encrypted with Alice’s public key.  If a 
third person, Trudy, intercepts the message, she cannot decrypt it without Alice’s private key.  
As long as Alice keeps her private key from anyone else, messages intended for her are secure.  
In asymmetric key systems, multiple transmitters can use the one public key to send messages to 
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a single recipient, but since the key pair is tied to a specific user, the keys cannot be used to 
communicate with anyone else in the network.  Because the keys in an asymmetric key system 
are tied to a specific user, the asymmetric key system also provides authentication control 
[KuR05, MOV96].  However, since it is computationally intense and because multiple keys are 
required, asymmetric encryption is not used in WSNs due to the limited CPU and memory 
capacity of WSN nodes. 
2.7.2 Key Distribution Techniques 
The distribution of keys within a network is an important aspect of the network’s overall 
security.  In a symmetric system, the key is secret and must be sent to the transmitter and 
receiver by secure means.  This could be by encryption with another key known as a Key 
Encryption Key (KEK) or by another means entirely, such as physical delivery by a courier 
[MOV96].   
Embedding keys into the memory of the WSN nodes is not practical since every key 
stored in memory occupies space that could be used for program code or sensor related data.  
Instead of embedding keys into WSN nodes, there are rekeying protocols which send new keys 
to WSN nodes.  Four methods are pair-wise keying, group keying, hierarchical trees, and Secure 
Lock [BaB02, Kru98].  It should be noted in this document, the terms rekeying protocol and 
keying protocol refer to the same protocol. 
2.7.2.1 Pair-wise Keying 
In pair-wise keying, a communications session is created between the two participants to 
exchange the necessary keys.  Even in a multicast group, each individual must establish a unicast 
session to be rekeyed.  This technique has the advantage of being the most secure since the 
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compromise of a key only compromises one node.  The drawback is the large number of keys 
required, which consume limited memory and make key management more difficult.  For a 
network of N nodes, each node must store N keys.   
2.7.2.2 Group Keying 
In a group keying network, all of the members of a group share a common key.  While 
this reduces the complexity of the system, it increases risk.  If the key is compromised, all of the 
nodes in the group are compromised.  A group keying network provides a tradeoff between a 
single key shared by all users and pair-wise keying. 
2.7.2.3 Hierarchical Keying 
Hierarchical keying establishes a hierarchical tree of keys [SuR07].  When multiple 
nodes are addressed in a message, the lowest common key held by all nodes is used to send the 
message.  Figure 4 shows a hierarchical tree for eight nodes, which are assigned positions at the 
bottom of the tree.  The group key manager, not shown in Figure 4, sends each node keys using 
their assigned KEK.  The tree is formed by sending each node the next higher level key using 
that node’s KEK.  Then, the next higher level key is sent using the previous level’s key as the 
KEK.  In Figure 4, nodes 1 and 2 receive their common Level C key through individually 
encrypted messages using their unique KEKs.  Nodes 3 and 4 receive similar transmissions, but 
they receive their common Level C key.  Next, nodes 1 through 4 receive the common Level B 
key through encrypted transmissions using the Level C keys as the KEKs.  This process 
continues up the tree until all KEKs are established through Level A.  Finally, to establish a 
common group key, a Session Encryption Key (SEK) is sent to the entire tree using the Level A 
key as the KEK.  
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Figure 4.  Hierarchical Tree 
The advantage of hierarchical keying is the reduction in the total number of keys held by 
each node.  For a network size of N that uses the structure shown in Figure 3, the number of keys 
for each node is  
 
Number of keys = log2(N) + 2    (1) 
 
where the two additional keys are the node’s unique KEK and the entire group’s SEK.  
 A disadvantage of hierarchical keying is accommodating nodes that join the network.  If 
a node attempts to join a hierarchical tree that is full, the new node is either denied entry or an 
additional level must be added to the tree.  Adding an additional level to the tree doubles the total 
capacity of the tree at a cost of additional key transmissions to existing nodes, with one 
additional key added to each level.   
2.7.2.4 Secure Lock 
In Secure Lock [ChC89], each node is assigned a unique, pair-wise prime identification 
(ID) number.  When a Secure Lock is generated, the ID numbers of the nodes to be included in 
the message are used to generate a unique numerical solution based on the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem.  When each node divides the unique numerical solution by their assigned ID number, 
they all obtain the same remainder.  This remainder is the message intended for all of the 
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included nodes.  A user that is not intended to receive the message will still receive the Secure 
Locked message; however, when this user divides the received message by its assigned ID 
number, the user obtains the wrong result.   
To illustrate this, consider an example using 8-bit numbers.  An 8-bit message of A516 is 
to be sent to nodes 13110, 13710, and 13910.  Following the process described in Appendix A, the 
Secure Lock of this message is 26104C16 (249454010).  Node 131 (8316)has the remainder of 3810 
(2616).  A bit-wise XOR of 2616 and the node’s ID of 8316 gives the correct message of A516.  
The process for nodes 137 and 139 is the same and yields the same result.  For a node that was 
not included in the Secure Lock generation, such as node 149 (9516), the remainder for 2494540 / 
149 is 13110 (8316).  Performing a bit-wise XOR between 8316 and the node ID of 9516 yields 
1616, which is not the correct solution.  
Secure Lock does not scale well as the key size or number of recipients increase.  Figure 
5 shows the linear relationship between the number of nodes included and the size of the Secure 
Lock message for six different key sizes.  The linear relationship between the message size and 
the key size can be seen as well.  At 5,000 nodes the message size doubles between 32 and 64-bit 
keys.  It doubles again between 64 and 128-bit keys.  This linear relationship holds for all of the 
network sizes shown in Figure 5. 
An advantage of Secure Lock is the ability to have one broadcast or multicasted message 
“unlocked” by selected recipients.  However, Secure Lock does not scale well.  In the example 
above, the message grew from one byte to three; a linear relationship.  However, the time and 
memory needed at the key generation system to generate the Secure Lock grows exponentially as 
more recipients are included [AnM08].   
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Figure 5.  Secure Lock Message Size [AnM08] 
2.8 Key Management in Multicast Groups  
The objectives of a multicast security infrastructure are to preserve authentication and 
confidentiality for all group communications so only registered senders can send packets to the 
group and only they can read packets received from the group [MRR99].  To achieve these 
objectives, a key management system must rekey users in the proper manner and at appropriate 
times to ensure the security of the system.  
Group Key Management focuses on the dynamic group key problem.  Since IGMP is 
open, it is common for group key management protocols to not use IGMP for security.  When a 
member joins or leaves the group, the group key manager usually assumes the member continues 
to have access before or after being allowed membership [JuA02].  To ensure the security of the 
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group, it is common to rekey the group to ensure that new members cannot decrypt group 
messages sent before the new member joined and to ensure a departing member cannot continue 
to decrypt messages after leaving the group [JuA02]. 
2.8.1 Gothic Group Key Management 
Gothic’s GKM is a part of the Group Access Control Aware – Group Key Management 
system (GACA-GKM).  By using the authorized membership information in the GAC, the key 
manager can make efficient decisions about when group rekeying is required.  With perfect 
group access control provided by the routers, only authorized nodes can receive the group’s 
communications, a new member joining the group does not require the group to rekey since the 
new member could not receive the groups communications before it joined.  Likewise, after 
leaving the group, the departed member can no longer receive group messages and a rekey is not 
required [JuA02].  This ignores the possibility of an eavesdropping node, but the reduction of 
rekey operations improves the scalability of the network. 
Gothic uses these three rules to determine if a rekey is required [JuA02]: 
1. If a host joins a multicast session and has previously been a member of 
the same multicast session, a rekey must occur. 
2. If a host leaves a multicast session and will remain in the same 
multicast tree session, a rekey must occur. 
3. Otherwise, there is no need to rekey. 
In a wireless setting, suppose two nodes are within range of a wireless access point.  One 
is an authorized group member and second is not.  However, they both are able receive wireless 
network traffic.  If the second user eventually becomes a group member, the group must rekey 
due to rule 1, above.  Since the second node could have stored past traffic and now has access to 
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the key used to secure those messages, the second node could decrypt the old messages that were 
sent before it became a member.  A similar situation occurs when a member leaves, but still is 
able to receive group communications (rule 2, above).   
In a wireless environment, there is no way to prevent unauthorized nodes from receiving 
network traffic.  Therefore, the GACA-GKM cannot ensure the security of the group through 
limiting access to the encrypted communications as can be done with IGMP-capable wired 
routers.  However, GACA-GKM still provides a benefit to the group since it tracks the cluster 
membership of each group member.  Based on this information, the GACA-GKM reduces rekey 
operations when an authorized member from one cluster moves to another cluster.  In this case, a 
rekey is not required for either cluster. 
2.8.2 Spatial Clustering 
Spatial clustering reduces the number of rekey operations by dividing a large network 
into smaller clusters along geographic boundaries [BaB02].  These clusters are bounded by size, 
do not overlap [BaB02], and nodes are not allowed to be a member of more than one cluster.  
Each cluster is independent and has its own group key.  If a member of the group leaves or if a 
new member joins, only that cluster requires a rekey.   
Spatial clustering does not require any prior deployment knowledge of the network.  The 
spatial clustering protocol determines clusters by fixing an integer value for k.  Stable clusters 
have between k and 2k-1 members [BaB02].  To form clusters, the protocol traverses the 
multicast tree from the leaves to the root, assigning members to clusters as it traverses the 
multicast tree [HRB08].  If new nodes join the network, a cluster may exceed 2k-1 members.  In 
that case, the cluster splits into two stable clusters of size k or larger.  After the protocol 
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stabilizes across the entire network, it is still possible that one undersized, unstable cluster will 
remain near the root.   
Each group is assigned a cluster leader.  The cluster leader maintains information about 
cluster membership, but is not involved in any of the security aspects of allowing or 
authenticating requests for membership into the multicast group [BaB02].  Spatial clustering 
relies on an authentication service outside the protocol to authorize and authenticate the multicast 
group members. 
Since spatial clustering does not require any pre-deployment knowledge of the network, 
is based on spatial relationships, and reduces the impact of a rekey operation, it is a promising 
protocol for a wireless sensor networks deployed in a random fashion.  Spatial clustering should 
conserve battery power in such a WSN. 
2.8.3 Iolus 
Iolus divides large networks into smaller clusters, like spatial clustering [BaB02], but 
uses administrative boundaries and does not limit the number of members in a cluster.  Iolus also 
uses predetermined nodes as Group Security Agents (GSAs), instead of the dynamically assigned 
cluster leaders of spatial clustering [BaB02].  Iolus is well suited for networks or portions of 
networks that are statically assigned and do not change very often. 
2.9 The Hubenko Architecture 
The Hubenko architecture is designed to provide secure communications to large 
networks of mobile users.  It combines elements of Iolus, Spatial Clustering, and Gothic and 
applies them to a network of low earth orbit satellites providing network connectivity.  
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At the top level of the Hubenko architecture, the low earth orbit satellites, Iolus divides 
the network into smaller pieces.  Since the satellites follow pre-determined orbits, it is feasible to 
pre-assign clusters and the assign the role of GSA to the satellites [HRB08].  
Each spot beam of each satellite constitutes a spatial cluster.  Given the dynamic nature 
of the membership of each cluster, spatial clustering is preferable, since it can adapt to changes 
in the network as nodes join or leave.  
However, high mobility users that move from one cluster to another can trigger a large 
number of rekey operations.  To eliminate unnecessary rekey operations, Gothic’s GACA-GKM 
controls membership and determines if a rekey is needed [HRB08].  
An example of the Hubenko architecture is shown in Figure 6.  Satellite spot beams are 
labeled A thru H.  These constitute clusters, each with their own group key.  The numbers 1 
through 16 identify unique users in the network.  The satellites form their own cluster with links 
labeled by the common group key, “V”.  Gothic’s GACA-GKM at each satellite controls 
multicast group membership and determines when group rekeys are required, such as when a 
user in cluster B moves to cluster C.  In this example, since the user is trusted before, during, and 
after its move from cluster B to cluster C, a rekey operation is not required.  
2.9.1 Experimental Results 
The Hubenko architecture is compared to a flat baseline architecture and to the spatial 
clustering architecture in five different scenarios of varying user mobility with one hundred 
iterations for each scenario [HRB08].  Table 4 shows the user types for each iteration in the five 
scenarios, with users that increase in mobility from lowest to highest: stationary, ground, sea, and 
air.  The scenarios start with stationary nodes and increase in mobility.  The last scenario has the 
most high-mobility users. 
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Figure 6.  The Hubenko Architecture [Hub08] 
Table 4.  Rates of Mobility Sets [HRB08] 
Iteration User Types 
1 through 100  All Stationary 
101 through 200  ~1/2 Stationary, 1/2 Ground 
201 through 300  ~1/3 Stationary, Ground, Sea 
301 through 400  ~1/4 Stationary, Ground, Sea, Air 
401 through 500  ~1/5 Stationary, Ground, Sea; 2/5 Air 
 
Figure 7 has the results of the five scenarios shown in Table 4.  For the first scenario, all 
users are stationary and the Hubenko architecture does not provide any benefit over spatial 
clustering alone.  The flat architecture shows the highest number of rekeys since all users belong 
to one group, sharing the same key.  As the mobility of the users increases the number of rekey 
operations increases rapidly in both the flat baseline and spatial clustering architectures, while 
the Hubenko architecture increases linearly.  While the Hubenko Architecture has similar 
performance for each scenario, other rekeying techniques show dramatic increases in the amount 
rekeying operations they perform [HRB08]. 
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Figure 7.  Average User Re-Key Count Comparison [Hub08] 
A WSN that does not experience high mobility will still experience changes in network 
topology as nodes become inoperative or as new nodes join.  The Hubenko architecture is 
expected to benefit WSNs similar to the second scenario, iterations 101 through 200. 
2.10 Hubenko Architecture Applied to Swarms of Autonomous UAVs 
The Hubenko architecture has been studied in the context of swarms of autonomous 
UAVs [Phi08].  Improved scalability of the Hubenko architecture over spatial clustering and a 
flat architecture was demonstrated [Phi08]. 
2.10.1 Research Approach 
The Hubenko architecture is adapted to a network of UAVs, shown in Figure 8.  At the 
top of the network is a Global Hawk UAV, which acts as the overall security controller for the 
entire network.  In the middle tier are mid-sized UAVs which normally operate at 10,000 feet.  
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The lowest tier is comprised of micro UAVs which operate at an altitude of hundreds of feet.  
Instead of being limited by the satellite beam size, the size of the clusters is limited by the radio 
footprint of the middle tier UAVs.  Each cluster has its own key, identified by “CKn”, and the 
dashed lines between the Global Hawk and the cluster leaders show the GACA-GKM 
relationships [Phi08]. 
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Cluster Leader
Cluster Members
GACA-GKM
Highly Mobile UAV
 
Figure 8.  Hubenko Architecture Applied to UAV Swarm [Phi08] 
When the multicast group first forms, the Global Hawk assigns cluster leaders.  The ideal 
cluster leaders are the mid sized UAVs, which are closer to the swarms of smaller UAVs, have 
longer endurance than the micro UAVs and have more powerful radios [Phi08].  
Tables 5 and 6 show the factors used for two experimental scenarios.  Besides the 
differences shown in the factors below, scenario 1 has a duration of 2 hours, while scenario 2 has 
a duration of 12 hours.  The experimental design is full factorial with 1,968 simulation runs total 
[Phi08].   
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Table 5.  Factor Levels Scenario 1 [Phi08] 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Swarm Size 40 100 200 500 
Swarm Mobility  25% 75%   
Group Join Rate 15% 30%   
Group Departure Rate 25% 75%   
Security Architecture Baseline Clustered Hubenko  
 
Table 6.  Factor Levels Scenario 2 [Phi08] 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Swarm Size 40 100 200 500 1000 
Swarm Mobility  25% 50% 75% 90%  
Security Architecture Baseline Clustered Hubenko   
 
 
The swarm size indicates how many UAVs are in the network.  The swarm mobility is 
the percentage of the swarm that is highly mobile, where highly mobile is defined as a UAV that 
moves beyond a 5 km radius.  The group join rate is the percentage of the total simulation time 
for the entire swarm to join the multicast group.  The group departure rate is the percentage of 
the swarm that departs before the end of the simulation.  The security architecture varies between 
flat, where all nodes use the same key, spatial clustering, and the Hubenko architecture [Phi08]. 
2.10.2 Results 
Philips found that the Hubenko architecture consistently improves performance as shown 
in Table 7.  In the four areas considered, the Hubenko architecture reduced the number of rekey 
operations, the bandwidth used, and battery power compared to the baseline and cluster 
architectures for the mobile swarms of UAVs [Phi08].  The range of values includes the results 
for all the factors shown above. 
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Table 7.  Reductions Observed [Phi08] 
  Hubenko compared to 
  Baseline Clustering 
Total Keys Distributed 58 - 88% 55 - 95% 
Rekeys per UAV 60 - 88% 59 - 95% 
Bandwidth Used to Rekey 73 - 88% 55 - 85% 
Battery Power Used to Rekey 17 - 59% 54 - 85% 
2.11 Summary  
This chapter presents the fundamental concepts and recent research in the areas of UAVs, 
MANETs, wireless sensor networks, multicast communications, security of wireless 
communications, encryption techniques, key distribution techniques, and access control 
techniques.  Current Hubenko architecture research results are also presented. 
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III. Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the experimental research methodology.  Section 3.1 presents the 
problem definition and approach.  Section 3.2 covers the system boundaries, while Section 3.3 
lists the services provided by the system.  Section 3.4 explains the system workload.  Section 3.5 
presents the performance metrics, followed by the system parameters in Section 3.6.  Section 3.7 
explains the factors used.  Section 3.8 presents the evaluation technique.  Section 3.9 covers the 
experimental design.  Section 3.10 summarizes the chapter. 
3.1 Problem Definition 
 
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
 
 For WSNs to be a useful and reliable military resource, they must have secure 
communications.  However, the cost of the security must be minimized, especially for the 
capability and resource-constrained nodes of a WSN.  Previous research on the Hubenko 
architecture indicates it is reasonable to expect the realized benefits will also apply to WSNs, 
even though WSNs experience fewer joins, leaves, and re-joins than autonomous UAV networks 
do [Phi08].  Prior research also concluded the Hubenko architecture could benefit from a 
different rekeying protocol [Hub08, Phi08].   
This research evaluates the performance of the Hubenko architecture using three different 
rekeying protocols within the Hubenko architecture as applied to a WSN.   
The goals of this research are to: 
• Improve the efficiency of rekeying operations within a WSN. 
• Investigate whether using hierarchical rekeying or Secure Lock provides 
measurable benefits. 
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• Evaluate the impact of these rekeying protocols on the resource-constrained nodes 
of a WSN.  
• Determine which rekeying protocol should be applied given particular network 
parameters, such as WSN size.  
It is expected that the pair-wise keying approach used in the Hubenko architecture is a 
large source of inefficiency and that an alternative method will greatly reduce rekey overhead.   
3.1.2 Approach 
 The Hubenko architecture reduces rekeying operations by reducing the number of users 
who have to be rekeyed and how often they are required to rekey through pair-wise keying.  The 
effect of two alternative rekeying methods: hierarchical and Secure Lock is determined.  Figure 9 
is a conceptual view of the network.  At the bottom left is the WSN, split into n clusters.  Each 
cluster has its own SEK, provided by the GACA-GKM via a communications relay.     
 
Figure 9.  Conceptual View of Network 
The communications relay is positioned within 300 meters of the WSN [Cro08] and 
extends the transmission range of the WSN to reach the GACA-GKM.  This allows a 
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communication link via UAV to a satellite, enabling world-wide placement of the GACA-GKM 
and any external users to the network.  More details about the communications relay and its link 
budget are in Appendix B. 
3.2 System boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT), the Rekey Improved Hubenko Architecture, is a 
communication network that conforms to the Hubenko architecture and is comprised of the 
GKM and WSN as shown in Figure 10.  Additional components within the SUT include the 
communications channels and the rekey protocol.  The Component Under Test (CUT) is the 
rekey protocol: pair-wise, hierarchical or Secure Lock.   
CUT:
Rekey
Protocol
GKM
WSN
Comm Channel
System Parameters:
Link Availability
Link Capacity
WSN Size
Battery Power
Node Distribution in WSN
Processing Power of Nodes
Workload Parameters:
Key Size
# Users to Rekey
Departure Rate
Node Mobility
Metrics:
Total Rekey Transmissions
Battery Power Consumed
Memory Space Used 
 
Figure 10.  System Under Test: the Rekey Improved Hubenko Architecture 
The system parameters include the battery power of the WSN nodes, the size of the 
WSN, the distribution of nodes within the WSN, the processing power of the nodes in the 
network, the link availability, and link capacity.  
The workload parameters include the size of the key, the number of nodes in the network 
to rekey, the mobility rate, and the departure rate of nodes from the network.   
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The metrics include the total number of bits transmitted to perform a rekey within the 
network, the amount of battery power consumed within the network, and the amount of memory 
within the WSN nodes required to store rekey messages.  
Since this research focuses on different rekeying protocols, a reliable communication 
channel is assumed and all messages sent in the network are received without error.  The 
modeling of a network with retransmissions is left for future work. 
3.3 System Services 
  The system provides secure network communications as well as a rekeying service for 
the entire WSN.  One of the requirements of secure communications is the ability to securely 
provide new keys to authorized recipients to ensure continued network access of authorized 
users, while denying unauthorized users access to past, present or future network traffic.   
3.4 Workload 
  The workload of the SUT consists of the rekeying messages passed between nodes.  For 
this research effort, the SUT workload is the network traffic associated with a rekey operation, 
which is dependent on the rekeying protocol used, the size of the key used, the number of users 
to be rekeyed, the mobility rate of nodes within the network, and the rate at which nodes leave 
the network.  
 The rekey protocol can affect the SUT workload by changing the number of individual 
transmissions sent within the network.  For example, pair-wise keying requires a separate 
communication from the key generation node to every other node in the network.  On the other 
hand, a rekey message sent with Secure Lock requires only one rekey message for all members 
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of the group.  The number of keys sent under the hierarchical protocol depends on the number of 
nodes in the network, which determines the size of the hierarchical tree.  
 The size of the key has a direct impact on the SUT workload.  In addition to having more 
bits to transmit across the network, generating and using a longer key affects each node in the 
network by inducing a heavier workload.  
 Under any of the rekey protocols, a subset of the entire WSN can be rekeyed.  As more 
users are required to be rekeyed, the workload increases. 
 Nodes may be re-assigned to new clusters within the network to achieve enhanced 
efficiency or some operational effect.  As the nodes move from one cluster to another, they do 
not trigger rekey operations in their old or new cluster, but they must receive the new keys to 
communicate within their new cluster.  This places additional workload on the system distinct 
from node departures. 
 Nodes in a WSN depart the network when their battery is depleted.  Nodes can also be 
damaged, captured, or otherwise unavailable.  To maintain the security of the network, a rekey 
operation ensures the trust of the remaining nodes within the network.  It is assumed the system 
is aware of all departures.  To track departures, cluster leaders are responsible for tracking cluster 
members as well as dormant nodes. 
3.5 Performance Metrics  
  Performance metrics provide a means to measure the impact a particular rekeying 
protocol has.  The metrics collected include the total number of bits required for rekey 
transmissions in the network, the battery power consumed, and the memory space used in the 
WSN nodes. 
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 When a rekey operation is requested, the number of bits transmitted within the network 
distinguishes the impact of the different rekeying protocols.  The number of bits transmitted is 
measured at the communications relay outside the WSN, shown in Figure 9. 
 Conserving energy in WSN nodes is important, since once the battery is consumed, the 
node is inoperative.  Nodes in the middle of a WSN are at the most risk since they route much of 
the traffic through the network.  By calculating the power consumed by each radio transmission 
during a rekey operation, power consumption is determined.   
 The memory in WSN nodes is also limited.  By measuring the number of bits each 
protocol requires during a rekey operation, the memory space occupied can be determined.  
Comparing how each rekeying protocol uses memory is a useful metric in choosing the best 
rekeying protocol for use in a network. 
3.6 System Parameters 
 System parameters affect the performance of the SUT.  These include: link capacity, link 
availability, the size of the WSN, WSN node battery power, the distribution of nodes within the 
WSN, and the processing power of nodes. 
 The link capacity used for this research is 250 kb/s [Cro08].  Each link provides reliable 
communications. 
 The WSN node battery power matches the Crossbow IRIS, which has a pair of standard 
AA batteries providing 2800 mAh of power [Ene08]. 
 The Crossbow IRIS processor runs at 16 MHz and has 128 KB of memory [Atm08, 
Cro08].  The key generation node (GACA-GKM) is a desktop PC with a 3.4 GHz processor and 
2 GB of memory.  
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 The WSN is split into ten clusters of equal capacity.  The individual nodes are assigned to 
clusters according to a uniform distribution. 
3.7 Factors  
 The factors herein provide insight into the impact of the different rekeying protocols 
without excessive or redundant effort.  The factors include: rekeying protocol, key size, WSN 
size, mobility rate, and departure rate.  Table 8 shows a summary of the factors and their 
associated levels. 
Table 8.  Factor Levels 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Rekey Protocol      pair-wise   Secure Lock   hierarchical    
Key size 128 bits 256 bits 512 bits   
WSN Size 40 100 500 1000 
Mobility 0% 5%     
Departure Rate 25% 75%     
 
The rekeying protocol factor has three levels: pair-wise, Secure Lock, and hierarchical.  
The pair-wise protocol is the baseline.  Secure Lock and hierarchical provide two alternatives.  
The key size has three levels: 128, 256, and 512 bits.  The 256-bit key is the baseline and 
matches previous research [Phi08].  These key sizes are typical and give some variation to 
determine the impact of the key size on the system.  
The size of the WSN has four levels: 40, 100, 500, and 1000 nodes.  These levels 
represent a reasonable range of WSN sizes to assess how the rekeying protocols scale.  The three 
smallest values mirror previous research [Phi08].  The largest value represents a large WSN.   
The mobility rate varies between 0% and 5%.  This factor specifies how many mobile 
nodes there are within the network.  For the Hubenko architecture to have a benefit over 
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clustering alone, nodes must move within the network.  Mobility does not mean the nodes have 
to physically move.  As time goes on, it may be more efficient for a node to be re-assigned from 
one cluster to another if it is in close proximity to two or more clusters and the cluster it is 
assigned to experiences a large number of departures.  In this simulation, the GACA-GKM 
tracks membership of all clusters and re-assigns nodes to new clusters.  Each mobile node can 
move up to two times during the simulation, based on a random uniform distribution.   
The departure rate has two levels: 25% and 75%.  This factor represents how many nodes 
depart the network before the end of the simulation and matches previous research [Phi08].  The 
departure times are based on a random normal distribution with a mean of 75% of the simulation 
length and standard deviation of 10% of the simulation length.  The normal distribution 
approximates the lifespan of a battery powered WSN node.  
3.8 Evaluation Technique  
The network is simulated using Matlab 2007a.  The network is shown in Figure 9 and 
rekeyed based on the factors above.   
Simulation is the only practical choice for this research.  Even if a WSN of 1,000 nodes 
was available, configuring the network to perform as required, operating it, and collecting the 
data generated would be impractical.   
The simulation is a discrete-time simulation.  The simulation randomly assigns trigger 
events at the start of the simulation (such as joins and departures).  Results are stored in matrices 
that are exported to Excel spreadsheet files for post-simulation analysis.  The simulation has 
duration of 30 days, which is equivalent to systems currently fielded by the US Army [L3C04, 
L3C04b]. 
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The simulation is validated by comparing the baseline results with the results of the 
previous research for the autonomous UAV network performed by Phillips [Phi08].  
3.9 Experimental Design 
 The experiment uses a full factorial design.  Given the factors listed above, 144 unique 
scenarios are required (3*3*4*2*2=144) to collect the data for each combination of factors.   
A confidence level of 95% is used and each scenario is replicated ten times.  This 
requires 1440 distinct runs of the simulation.   
3.10 Summary 
 This chapter presents the methodology to evaluate three different rekeying protocols 
using the Hubenko architecture in a WSN.  The performance of these protocols is evaluated by 
simulation and collects: total number of bits transmitted for rekeys, battery power consumed, and 
the memory space used at the WSN nodes.  A full factorial experiment defines 144 unique 
scenarios to collect the metrics using the following factors: rekey protocol, key size, the size of 
the WSN, the mobility rate, and the departure rate.  Each scenario is run ten times, totaling 1440 
simulation runs.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
This chapter presents and analyzes the experimental results.  First, the methods used to 
verify and validate the simulation models are discussed in Section 4.1.  Next, the results of each 
individual performance metric are presented in Section 4.2.  Finally, an overall analysis of the 
results is provided in Section 4.3.  Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter. 
4.1 Model Verification and Validation 
 This section presents the verification and validation of the Matlab computer models in the 
experiment.  Verification of a computer model ensures the model does what it is intended to do, 
that it has been debugged, and has been implemented properly [Jai91].  Since the model used is 
modified from previous research [Phi08], an incremental approach used during modification 
ensures the model continues to work properly.   
4.1.1 Verification of the Matlab Simulation 
 The modified Matlab model has some key differences from the baseline Matlab model, 
which investigated the advantage of the Hubenko architecture in swarms of autonomous UAVs 
[Phi08].  The baseline model is modified to represent a field of WSN nodes instead of UAVs 
flying about a cluster leader [Phi08].  The modifications include changes to how nodes depart the 
network, when rekey operations are triggered and when rekey operation statistics are gathered.  
Additional functions are added to the modified model to represent the hierarchical and Secure 
Lock keying functions that are not in the baseline model. 
The modified model has normally distributed departures instead of the uniform 
distribution of the baseline model.  Since the modified model is adapted to represent battery 
powered devices with the same specifications conducting similar functions under similar 
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conditions, a normal distribution of the entire population more closely represents how nodes will 
expire when their battery is depleted than a uniform distribution.  The model uses a mean 
departure time of 75% of the total simulation time with a standard deviation of 10% of the 
simulation time.  When the simulation is set to a 25% departure rate, 75% of the nodes will 
function for the entire simulation time.  The remaining 25% of the nodes depart according to the 
normal distribution described. 
 The modified model triggers cluster rekeys and collects statistics differently than the 
baseline model.  Since a rekey to a hierarchical keyed cluster depends on the position of the node 
in the hierarchical tree, it is not feasible to wait until the end of the simulation’s discrete time 
step to initiate the rekey process.  The modified model triggers a rekey as soon as a cluster 
requires it.  Metrics are collected at this time instead of waiting until the end of the time step. 
 To represent currently-available WSN security systems [L3C04, L3C04b], the simulation 
time in the modified model is extended from the baseline model’s two hours to thirty days.  To 
keep the time required to collect data reasonable, the discrete time step in the modified model is 
increased from one second to twenty seconds. 
 To draw comparisons between the three rekeying protocols, the pair-wise rekeying 
protocol in the baseline model is modified to record the number of bits transmitted instead of the 
number of rekeys performed.  
4.1.2 Verification of the Secure Lock Measurements 
 To measure the performance of Secure Lock, a function is added to the Matlab simulation 
that reports the correct Secure Lock size in bits for a given number of recipients.  An 
independent Matlab function determines the size of the Secure Lock rekey message sizes.  
However, due to the precision limitations of Matlab, only the 8-bit result is calculated in the 
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Matlab function.  This function returns the same result as shown in Section 2.7.2.4, which is 
verified by hand calculation.  An independent Java simulation [AnM08] with arbitrary precision 
provides the Secure Lock message sizes for larger networks and key sizes.  The Java simulation 
also provides the same result as the example shown in Section 2.7.2.4.   
In the Matlab simulation, the Secure Lock function returns the same results as the Java 
simulation as shown in Figure 11.  Because the function returns the same result for the 8-bit 
example shown in Section 2.7.2.4 and displays the linear expansion of the message size as key 
size and network size increase (as described in Section 2.7.2.4), the Secure Lock function used in 
Matlab is considered verified. 
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Figure 11.  Verification and Validation of Secure Lock Function 
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4.1.3 Verification of the Hierarchical Measurements 
 To measure the rekey performance of a hierarchical tree, two functions are added to the 
Matlab simulation to report the correct number of keys transmitted when a node leaves or joins 
the cluster.  These functions are verified against measurements of the hierarchical rekey protocol 
described in previous research [BaB02].  Figure 12 shows the verification and validation of the 
Matlab function compared to the expected result from previous research [BaB02].  The response 
variable in Figure 12 is the number of keys required to build the hierarchical tree. 
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Figure 12.  Verification and Validation of Hierarchical Function 
4.1.4 Validation of the Matlab Simulation 
 Validation ensures that assumptions used in developing the model are reasonable and that 
the model produces results close to what is observed in real systems, theoretical results, or expert 
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intuition [Jai91].  The modified model is validated against the theoretical results of previous 
research [Phi08].  To validate the modified model against the baseline model, the modified 
model is compared to the baseline under the same conditions.  To accurately compare with 
previous research [Phi08], the WSN sizes include 40, 100, 200 and 500 nodes, and the departure 
rates are 25% and 75%.  The mobility rates include the previous research values of 25% and 75% 
[Phi08], as well as an additional mobility rate of 0% to verify the model works in the stationary 
case.  Table 9 summarizes the factor levels used for validation.  These levels differ slightly from 
the set of experimental levels; however the levels match previous research [Phi08] and allow 
direct comparison of the new model to the previous one. 
Table 9.  Factor Levels Used for Validation 
Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Mobility Rate 0% 25% 75%  
WSN Size 40 100 200 500 
Departure Rate 25% 75%   
 
The validation results are shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  Figure 13 shows the 
number of 256-bit keys transmitted during the entire simulation for four different WSN sizes 
when the entire network has a node departure rate of 75%.  The responses graphed are for two 
cases of the baseline model (represented with dashed lines) and three cases of the modified 
model (plotted with solid lines).  The lowest curve is the modified model with zero percent 
mobility; this curve parallels the baseline model.  Since it maintains the lowest number of keys 
transmitted for all cases, it also maintains the correct relationship compared to the baseline 
model’s 25% and 75% mobility cases.   
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The modified 25% and 75% mobility cases both report consistently higher numbers of 
keys transmitted than the baseline model for the same level of mobility.  To support a fair 
comparison between hierarchical keying and the other methods, the model is modified from the 
baseline to immediately rekey the cluster when required.  The baseline model waits until the end 
of the current discrete time step before it records a rekey operation.  This difference results in 
more keys being transmitted in the modified model, consistent with the plotted responses.  
Again, the modified 25% and 75% mobility cases are consistent with the baseline responses.  
Therefore, the model is valid for a 75% departure rate.   
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Figure 13.  Model Validation with a 75% Departure Rate 
Figure 14 is similar to Figure 13, but shows the results for a node departure rate of 25%.  
As before, the lowest curve is the modified model with zero percent mobility; this curve is 
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consistent to the baseline model.  Since it maintains the lowest number of keys transmitted for all 
cases, it also has the correct relationship compared to the baseline model’s 25% and 75% 
mobility cases.  Again, the modified 25% and 75% mobility cases both have consistently higher 
numbers of keys transmitted than the baseline model for the same level of mobility.  For the 
same reason given above, this is expected.  As before, the modified 25% and 75% mobility cases 
are consistent with the baseline responses.  Therefore, the model is valid for a 25% departure 
rate.   
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Figure 14.  Model Validation with a 25% Departure Rate 
The modified model performs as expected and is consistent with results from previous 
research [Phi08].   
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4.1.5 Validation of Secure Lock Measurements 
To evaluate the performance of Secure Lock, a separate Java simulation is created for a 
variety of network conditions [AnM08].  The results from the Java simulation are coded into a 
Matlab function that returns the Secure Lock message size in bits based on the number of 
network nodes to be rekeyed and the size of the key used.  As shown in Figure 11, the Matlab 
function returns Secure Lock message sizes identical to the published Java simulation results.  
Both functions return identical results to the example shown in Section 2.7.2.4.  Therefore, the 
Secure Lock function is considered valid.   
4.1.6 Validation of Hierarchical Measurements  
To measure the performance of the hierarchical rekeying protocol, two Matlab functions 
are included in the simulation.  The first Matlab hierarchical function reports the number of bits 
transmitted to a new cluster member if the rest of the hierarchical tree is not required to rekey, 
such as when an authorized user moving from one cluster to another.  The number of bits 
transmitted in this case is based on the number of levels in the hierarchical tree.  The second 
Matlab function returns the number of bits transmitted to the entire cluster if it is required to 
rekey.  This number is based on the number of levels in the tree, as well as the location of the 
joining/departing node in the tree.  The second function accounts for vacant spaces in the tree 
and does not transmit keys to users not in the tree.  This simulates the GACA-GKM awareness of 
the membership of the hierarchical tree.  Both functions are based on previous work [BaB02] and 
the values returned by both functions match hand-calculated values, as shown in Figure 12.  
Therefore, the hierarchical functions are considered valid.   
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4.2 Results and Analysis of Performance Metrics 
 This section presents and analyzes the results of the measurements made from the Matlab 
simulation.  The number of bits transmitted is closely examined, followed by analysis of battery 
power and the amount of memory space consumed for rekey operations. 
 To detect if there is any statistically significant cause of variation within the experiment, 
an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table, like Table 10 is used.  By filling in the table from left 
to right, the P value is calculated.  The P value indicates whether a factor (such as rekey 
protocol) contributes more variation between different groups than is expected.  If P is less than 
0.05, the factor is considered statistically significant. 
The raw bits transmitted data exhibited a residual-value-versus-fits plot with a strong 
increasing trend from very small to very large, which precludes the use of ANOVA.  A log 
transform of the number of bits transmitted data successfully compensated the trend and allows 
for an ANOVA to be used.   
4.2.1 Analysis of Bits Transmitted 
 The number of bits transmitted is measured from the communications relay on the edge 
of the WSN, as shown in Figure 9.  Table 10 presents the general linear model ANOVA table for 
the log number of bits transmitted by the communications relay for rekey operations.  The first 
and second order terms used in the ANOVA account for 99.95% of the variance in the number of 
bits transmitted.  The three terms that contribute the most variance are marked in bold.  Since all 
values in the P column are less than 0.05, all terms are considered statistically significant. 
For the ANOVA results to be valid, the residuals must be independent and normally 
distributed with zero mean.  Figure 15 presents four charts to examine these assumptions.  The 
ideal, normal probability plot is a straight diagonal line.  In the top left corner of Figure 15, the 
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normal probability plot shown has some curvature in tails, which indicates skewness in the data.  
Because the mean of the histogram shown in the bottom left corner is slightly offset to the right, 
the histogram also shows skewness in the data.  Overall, the curve does follow a normal 
distribution and skewness is minor.  The mean is zero to sixteen decimal places.  The scatter 
plots on the right side of Figure 15 are visual tests of independence of the residuals.  Since there 
are no clear trends in either plot, the residuals are assumed independent.  
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Figure 15.  Visual Plots to Verify ANOVA Assumptions for All Data 
 The ANOVA shown in Table 10 attributes the majority of the variance to WSN Size 
(92.40%) followed by the second-order effect of rekey protocol * WSN size (2.67%) and then 
the rekey protocol (2.26%).  The first-order effect of key size (1.87%) is next, followed by the 
departure rate (0.41%) and the second-order effect of (0.31%).  The error term accounts for 
0.05% and the remaining first and second order terms contribute less to the variance than the 
error term.   
 56
Table 10.  ANOVA Results for Log Number of Bits Transmitted for All Data 
Source DF SS 
% 
Variance MS F P 
Rekey Protocol 2 29.879 2.26 14.940 29091.86 0.000
WSN Size 3 1220.004 92.40 406.668 791900.98 0.000
Key Size 2 24.663 1.87 12.331 24012.76 0.000
Departure 1 5.392 0.41 5.392 10500.03 0.000
Mobility 1 0.045 0.00 0.045 87.21 0.000
Rekey Protocol * WSN Size 6 35.224 2.67 5.871 11431.80 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Key Size 4 4.155 0.31 1.039 2022.92 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Departure 2 0.008 0.00 0.004 7.66 0.000
WSN Size * Key Size 6 0.203 0.02 0.034 65.81 0.000
Error 1412 0.725 0.05 0.001     
Total 1439 1320.298 100.00       
 
Figure 16 shows the main effects plots, which visually presents the first-order effects of 
the measured data.   
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Figure 16.  Main Effects Plots for All Data 
Overall, the data shows that larger WSNs require more bits to be transmitted during rekey 
operations, but this is expected.  As seen in the ANOVA, the WSN size has the largest effect.  
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This is expected since the number of bits transmitted increases as the WSN increases in size.  
However, since the WSN size accounts for so much of the variation (92.40%), additional 
analysis is performed to determine if more insight is gained by removing WSN size as a factor. 
 
4.2.1.1 Analysis of Bits Transmitted by WSN Size 
The data is partitioned into four groups by WSN size and each group analyzed separately.  
Appendix C presents the plots of the data with confidence intervals.  The first group analyzed is 
for the WSN size of 40 nodes.  Figure 17 shows the four plots used to visually verify the 
underlying assumptions of the ANOVA shown in Table 11.  In the top left of Figure 17, the 
normal probability plot is fairly linear.  The bump near the middle indicates more residual 
measurements in this portion of the data than a normal distribution predicts.  This is confirmed in 
the histogram in the lower left of Figure 17.  The curve shown in the histogram is normal with 
the exception of the spike of residual measurements to the right of the mean.  The mean is zero 
and there is very little skew.  The spike in residual measurements is slight, but is accepted as not 
affecting normality since conclusions are drawn across all four cases of WSN size.  On the right-
hand side of Figure 17, there is no clear pattern, so the residuals are assumed to be independent.  
With the exception of mobility, the Appendix C plots indicate statistically significant differences 
between the data points. 
Table 11 presents the ANOVA for a WSN size of 40 nodes.  The factors presented 
account for 99.14% of the total variance.  The values in the P column less than 0.05 are 
considered statistically significant.  Since the P values for the second-order factors of rekey 
protocol * mobility and key size * departure are greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be 
ruled out and they are not considered to be statistically significant contributors to variance.  The 
top three contributors to the variance are marked in bold.  The largest is the rekey protocol 
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(73.40%), followed by the key size (19.81%) and then the departure rate (4.39%).  The only term 
that contributed more than the error rate (0.86%) is the second-order effect of rekey protocol * 
key size (1.34%). 
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Figure 17.  Visual Plots to Verify ANOVA Assumptions for WSN Size = 40 Nodes 
Table 11.  ANOVA Results for Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 40 Nodes 
Source DF SS 
% 
Variance MS F P 
Rekey Protocol 2 17.3699 73.40 8.685 14686.78 0.000
Key Size 2 4.6878 19.81 2.344 3963.70 0.000
Departure 1 1.0395 4.39 1.040 1757.80 0.000
Mobility 1 0.0386 0.16 0.039 65.20 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Key Size 4 0.3167 1.34 0.079 133.87 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Mobility 2 0.0012 0.01 0.001 0.99 0.374
Departure * Mobility 1 0.0062 0.03 0.006 10.43 0.001
Key Size * Departure 2 0.0001 0.00 0.000 0.05 0.953
Error 344 0.2034 0.86 0.001     
Total 359 23.6633 100.00       
 Figure 18 shows the main effects plots for the 40 node WSN.  Because it has the largest 
range of all four factors, the rekey protocol is the largest contributor to the response.  
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Hierarchical performs worse than pair-wise and both of them perform worse than Secure Lock.  
The response to key size is expected.  As the key size increases, the number of bits transmitted 
increases.  The departure rate response is also expected.  As more nodes depart the network, 
more rekey operations are required, thus more bits must be transmitted.  The mobility factor’s 
slight response is expected since the Hubenko architecture does not require rekey operations for 
nodes that move between clusters. 
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Figure 18.  Main Effects Plots for WSN Size = 40 
 Figure 19 shows the interactions between the factors for a WSN size of 40 nodes.  Most 
of the plots are comprised of parallel lines, indicating no significant interaction between the 
factors.  For example, the plot in the bottom right corner of Figure 19 shows the interaction 
between the departure rate and the mobility rate.  Since the lines are somewhat parallel and they 
never cross over each other, there is nothing of interest in the interaction between the two factors.   
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Figure 19.  Factor Interaction Plot for WSN Size = 40 Nodes 
For the WSN size of 100 nodes, Figure 20 presents visual plots to verify the assumptions 
of an ANOVA.  In the top left of Figure 20, the normal probability plot shows a mostly linear 
plot along the diagonal axis, with a shallow dip at an approximate residual values of -0.01 and 
with curvature in the right tail at the residual value of approximately 0.03.  The histogram in the 
bottom left shows a spike in residual measurements to the left of the mean which causes the 
shallow dip in top left plot.  A cluster of residual measurements in the extreme right of the 
histogram corresponds to the curvature in the right tail of the normal probability plot.  The mean 
is zero and there is slight skewness.  However, the plot is largely normal.  The right side of 
Figure 20 does not indicate any clear pattern, so the residuals are considered independent.   
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Figure 20.  Visual Plots to Verify ANOVA Assumptions for WSN Size = 100 Nodes 
 Table 12 presents the ANOVA for a WSN size of 100 nodes.  The factors in the table 
account for 99.77% of the total variance.  Most of the factors are statistically significant; only the 
second-order effect of key size * departure rate cannot exclude the null hypothesis with a P value 
of 0.843.   
Table 12.  ANOVA Results for Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 100 Nodes 
Source DF SS 
% 
Variance MS F P 
Rekey Protocol 2 12.5009 61.40 6.251 46370.63 0.000
Key Size 2 5.7150 28.07 2.858 21199.07 0.000
Departure 1 1.2959 6.36 1.296 9613.87 0.000
Mobility 1 0.0143 0.07 0.014 106.38 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Key Size 4 0.7844 3.85 0.196 1454.85 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Mobility 2 0.0017 0.01 0.001 6.36 0.002
Departure * Mobility 1 0.0026 0.01 0.003 19.31 0.001
Key Size * Departure 2 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.17 0.843
Error 344 0.0464 0.23 0.000     
Total 359 20.3613 100.00       
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The three terms that contribute the most to the variance are highlighted in bold.  The 
largest contributor is the rekey protocol (61.40%) followed by the key size (28.07%) and then the 
departure rate (6.36%).  The only second order effect to contribute more to the variance than the 
error rate (0.23%) is rekey protocol * key size (3.85%).  
Figure 21 shows the main effects plots for the 100 node WSN.  The rekey protocol has 
the largest variance.  Its performance is similar to the 40 node network.  Hierarchical performs 
the worse than pair-wise, and both of them perform worse than Secure Lock.  The response to 
key size is expected; as the key size increases, the number of bits transmitted increases.  The 
departure rate response is also expected.  As more nodes depart the network, more rekey 
operations are required, thus more bits must be transmitted.  The mobility factor’s slight response 
is expected due to the efficiency of the Hubenko architecture.  With the exception of mobility, 
the Appendix C plots indicate statistically significant differences between the data points. 
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Figure 21.  Main Effects Plots for WSN Size = 100 
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 Figure 22 displays the interactions between the factors for a WSN size of 100 nodes.  
Most of the plots are comprised of parallel lines and none cross, indicating no significant 
interaction between the factors. 
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Figure 22.  Factor Interaction Plot for WSN Size = 100 Nodes 
Figure 23 presents the visual plots to verify the assumptions required for the ANOVA 
table to be valid for a WSN size of 500 nodes.  In the top left of Figure 23, the normal 
probability plot shows a mostly linear plot along the diagonal axis, with curvature in the tails.  
The histogram in the bottom left shows a spike in residual measurements in the extreme right of 
the histogram, which corresponding to the curvature in the right tail of the normal probability 
plot.  The histogram ends on the left side at -0.09.  Going from approximately five measurements 
to none past -0.09 causes the downward curvature in the left end of the normal probability plot.  
The mean is zero and there is slight skewness.  However, the plot is mostly normal.  The right 
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side of Figure 23 does not indicate any clear pattern or trend, so the residuals are considered 
independent.   
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Figure 23.  Visual Plots to Verify ANOVA Assumptions for WSN Size = 500 Nodes 
 Table 13 presents the ANOVA for a 500 node WSN.   
Table 13.  ANOVA Results for Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 500 Nodes 
Source DF SS 
% 
Variance MS F P 
Rekey Protocol 2 12.4049 54.65 6.202 393578.88 0.000
Key Size 2 7.1088 31.32 3.554 225544.78 0.000
Departure 1 1.5299 6.74 1.530 97081.15 0.000
Mobility 1 0.0035 0.02 0.004 221.22 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Key Size 4 1.6411 7.23 0.410 26034.29 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Mobility 2 0.0041 0.02 0.002 130.57 0.000
Departure * Mobility 1 0.0007 0.00 0.001 42.45 0.000
Key Size * Departure 2 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.11 0.898
Error 344 0.0054 0.02 0.000     
Total 359 22.6983 100.00       
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The factors account for 99.98% of the variance in the log number of bits transmitted for rekeys to 
the network.  With the exception of the second order factor of key size * departure rate, all 
factors are statistically significant, with P values less than 0.05.  The top three factors are marked 
in bold.  The largest contributor to the variance is rekey protocol (54.65%) while the key size 
(31.32%) is the second largest contributor.  In third place is the second-order factor of rekey 
protocol * key size (7.23%).  Departure (6.74%) is the only other factor to have more 
contribution to the variance than the error rate (0.02%).   
 Figure 24 shows the main effects plot when the WSN size is 500 nodes.  The main 
difference between this plot and the ones for the smaller network sizes, is the hierarchical rekey 
protocol, with a mean of approximately 6.8, is almost on par with Secure Lock, with a mean 
value of approximately 6.75.  Both perform better than pair-wise, which has a mean value of 
almost 7.2.  The other factors exhibit similar results as the smaller networks. 
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Figure 24.  Main Effects Plots for WSN Size = 500 
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Figure 25 presents the interactions between factors when the WSN size is 500 nodes.  
This chart shows an interesting interaction between the rekey protocol and key size.  Secure 
Lock performs the best when the key size is 128 bits, but performs only slightly better than 
hierarchical when the key size becomes 256 bits.  When the key size is increases to 512 bits, the 
hierarchical rekey protocol is the best performer.  The other factors have parallel lines that do not 
cross over each other, indicating no significant interaction between the other factors.  With the 
exception of mobility, the Appendix C plots indicate statistically significant differences between 
the data points. 
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Figure 25.  Factor Interaction Plot for WSN Size = 500 Nodes 
Figure 26 presents the visual plots to verify the assumptions required for the ANOVA 
table to be valid for a WSN size of 1,000 nodes.  In the top left of Figure 26, the normal 
probability plot shows a mostly linear plot along the diagonal axis, with curvature in the tails.  
The histogram in the bottom left shows higher than expected numbers of residual measurements 
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in the extreme left and right of the histogram, which corresponds to the curvature in the tails of 
the normal probability plot.  The mean is zero and there is little, if any, skewness.  Overall, the 
plot trends along the overlaid normal distribution line.  The right side of Figure 26 does not 
indicate any clear pattern or trend, so the residuals are considered independent.   
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Figure 26.  Visual Plots to Verify ANOVA Assumptions for WSN Size = 1000 Nodes 
The ANOVA table for a WSN size of 1,000 nodes is presented in Table 14.  The factors 
in the table account for 99.99% of the variance between measurements.  With the exception of 
key size * departure rate, all of the factors are statistically significant with P values less than 
0.05.  The top three factors to influence the variance are marked in bold.  Rekey protocol 
(68.00%) is followed by key size (21.91%) and the second order effect of rekey protocol * key 
size (5.42%).  Departure rate (4.65%) is the only other factor to cause more variance than the 
error rate (0.01%). 
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Table 14.  ANOVA Results for Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 1000 Nodes 
Source DF SS 
% 
Variance MS F P 
Rekey Protocol 2 22.8273 68.00 11.414 1537830.01 0.000
Key Size 2 7.3539 21.91 3.677 495419.42 0.000
Departure 1 1.5610 4.65 1.561 210316.36 0.000
Mobility 1 0.0023 0.01 0.002 311.69 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Key Size 4 1.8187 5.42 0.455 61262.18 0.000
Rekey Protocol * Mobility 2 0.0048 0.01 0.002 322.76 0.000
Departure * Mobility 1 0.0003 0.00 0.000 43.06 0.000
Key Size * Departure 2 0.0000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.999
Error 344 0.0026 0.01 0.000     
Total 359 33.5709 100.00       
 
 Figure 27 presents the main effects plot when the WSN size is 1,000 nodes.  The notable 
difference between this chart and the previous ones is that the hierarchical rekey protocol is the 
best performing rekey protocol, with Secure Lock in second place.  Pair-wise is the worst 
performing rekey protocol as it requires the most bits to be transmitted for rekey operations. 
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Figure 27.  Main Effects Plots for WSN Size = 1,000 
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Figure 28 presents the interactions between factors when the WSN size is 1,000 nodes.  
This chart continues the trend seen in the previous interaction chart in Figure 25.  Figure 28 
shows a similar interaction between the rekey protocol and key size.  Secure Lock and 
hierarchical perform in a similar fashion when the key size is 128 bits, but hierarchical performs 
better for key sizes of 256 and 512 bits.  Pair-wise is the worst performer.  The other factors 
exhibit parallel lines that do not cross over each other, indicating no significant interaction 
between the other factors.  With the exception of mobility, the Appendix C plots indicate 
statistically significant differences between the data points. 
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Figure 28.  Factor Interaction Plot for WSN Size = 1,000 Nodes 
4.2.1.2 Combined Analysis of Bits Transmitted 
Appendix C presents the Log Number of Bits Transmitted data with the confidence 
intervals included.  When the individual results for all four WSN sizes are looked at in aggregate, 
there are several aspects that are consistent with the results of the combined data analysis.   
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Mobility has no significant effect on the number of bits transmitted.  The node mobility 
rate either matches or is exceeded by the error rate for every ANOVA table presented.  This is 
expected since the Hubenko architecture minimizes the number of rekey transmissions when an 
authorized user moves from one cluster to another.  The Hubenko architecture does not require a 
rekey of the cluster that a node departed from if it remains in the multicast group and becomes a 
member of a new cluster.  Likewise, the new cluster does not need to rekey since an already 
authorized node has joined the cluster.  In this case, the mobile node only needs the required 
keys to communicate within the new cluster.  Otherwise, a node that is new to the multicast 
group, or departing the multicast group entirely, requires a rekey of the cluster that the node is 
joining or leaving to ensure forward and backward security. 
 Additionally, the departure rate and key size both have direct impacts on the amount of 
bits transmitted for rekey operations.  As expected, when the departure rate increases, so did the 
number of bits transmitted.  As the key size increases, the number of bits transmitted increases as 
well.  While the key size has a linear increase, the result on the number of bits transmitted is not 
linear because when the key size is 512 bits and the WSN size is 1,000 nodes, the Secure Lock 
message size exceeds the maximum transfer unit size.  This causes the Secure Lock message to 
be broken up across multiple packets, incurring additional overhead. 
 The most interesting insight gained from removing the WSN size from the ANOVA 
tables is the impact of the rekey protocol on the number of bits transmitted.  The pair-wise 
protocol is outperformed in every case.  Secure Lock yields the fewest bits transmitted for 
networks of 100 or less nodes.  The hierarchical protocol performs best for the largest network of 
1,000 nodes.  When the network size is 500 nodes, the best rekey protocol depends on the size of 
 71
the key.  For largest key size, hierarchical performs best, while Secure Lock performs best for 
the two smaller key sizes of 128 and 256 bits. 
Table 15 shows the mean number of bits transmitted for all levels of WSN size, key size, 
and rekey protocol.  Appendix D presents this data with the confidence intervals including 
Figure 37, a plot of all the data shown in Table 15. 
Table 15.  Mean Number of Bits Transmitted 
      
Rekey 
Protocol ( x 10,000)   
WSN 
Size 
Key 
Size 
Pair-
wise Hierarchical
Secure 
Lock 
  128 9.8 19.7 4.8 
40 256 12.1 24.2 7.0 
  512 16.5 33.2 11.5 
  128 52.4 67.4 18.5 
100 256 64.4 82.9 30.5 
  512 88.3 113.7 54.4 
  128 1207.0 516.1 306.9 
500 256 1482.9 634.1 586.4 
  512 2034.7 870.1 1158.7 
  128 4777.1 1202.4 1156.0 
1000 256 5869.1 1477.2 2287.4 
  512 8052.9 2026.9 4551.3 
 
 Table 16 presents the analysis of the data shown in Table 15, where the hierarchical and 
Secure Lock rekey protocols are presented as a percentage of the baseline rekey protocol, pair-
wise.  As seen in earlier analysis, hierarchical performs worse than pair-wise for the two smallest 
network sizes of 40 and 100 nodes.  Secure Lock always outperforms pair-wise, and is usually 
the best performing with the exception of three configurations where hierarchical performs best.  
The best performing rekey protocol is shaded in grey. 
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Table 16.  Mean Number of Bits Transmitted: Percentage of Baseline (pair-wise)  
    Rekey Protocol 
WSN 
Size 
Key 
Size Hierarchical Secure Lock 
  128 200.68 % 48.85 % 
40 256 200.68 % 58.38 % 
  512 200.68 % 69.68 % 
  128 128.72 % 35.28 % 
100 256 128.72 % 47.32 % 
  512 128.72 % 61.61 % 
  128 42.76 % 25.42 % 
500 256 42.76 % 39.54 % 
  512 42.76 % 56.95 % 
  128 25.17 % 24.20 % 
1000 256 25.17 % 38.97 % 
  512 25.17 % 56.52 % 
 
4.2.1.3 Additional Observations 
 It should be noted that the implementation of the hierarchical rekey protocol in the 
simulation places it at a disadvantage.  Because nodes are randomly assigned to clusters, each 
hierarchical tree has excess capacity.  For example, in a network of 40 nodes, there should be an 
average of four nodes per cluster.  However, in practice, it is not uncommon for a cluster to have 
more than eight nodes assigned.  For pair-wise and Secure Lock, this does not present a problem 
since each protocol can handle any number of nodes within a cluster.  However, hierarchical 
trees are based on powers of two.  For example, to ensure sufficient capacity in all ten clusters of 
a 40-node network, each hierarchical cluster has a capacity of 16 nodes and the entire network 
has a capacity of 160 nodes, even though not all are used.  The excess capacity in this case 
requires two additional keys to be transmitted (six instead of four) per rekey operation per 
cluster.  If nodes can be efficiently assigned to hierarchical clusters thereby eliminating this 
wasted space, hierarchical rekeying can perform more efficiently when nodes depart.  If realized 
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in the 40 node case, hierarchical rekeying would require approximately 66.7% of the bits 
transmitted and the entries in Table 16 for a WSN size of 40 nodes would improve from 200% to 
134%.  Since each hierarchical tree has excess capacity, hierarchical rekeying will improve for 
all WSN sizes, but the improvement will be less for larger networks than the smaller ones since 
the number of keys eliminated becomes less significant compared to the number of keys required 
to maintain the hierarchical tree.  These gains are offset by the management and coordination 
communications needed to organize the nodes properly to fill the hierarchical trees efficiently 
and may not be worth the communication and processing cost.  This is left for future work. 
 It should also be noted that Secure Lock has an advantage in the simulation.  The Matlab 
simulation does not accommodate retransmissions of rekey messages.  As noted in previous 
research [AnM08], Secure Lock performs best when all nodes receive the Secure Lock in a 
single transmission.  If the Secure Lock message must be re-transmitted, the large size of the 
Secure Lock message hampers performance.  The application of Secure Lock in a network 
simulator that accommodates network conditions requiring retransmissions is left for future 
work. 
4.2.2 Analysis of Battery Power Consumed 
 
 In a wireless sensor network, preservation of battery power is an important consideration 
since nodes cease to function when the limited battery power is expended.  This section analyzes 
the impact of the Section 4.2.1.2 results on the battery life span in a WSN. 
 Given that a typical WSN node uses two AA batteries [Cro08] and those batteries have a 
capacity of 2.85 mAh [Ene08], the total battery capacity is known.  The power consumption of a 
typical WSN node is known to be 17 mA when transmitting at 3 dBm and 16 mA when receiving 
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[Cro08].  Using the mean number of bits transmitted from Table 15, the amount of time required 
to transmit rekey messages from the communications relay is 
Time to transmit (relay) or receive (WSN) = number of bits / link capacity   (2) 
Given the link capacity of 250 kb/s [Cro08], the time for each case is shown in Table 17.  
The time to transmit from the communications relay is the same as required by the WSN to 
receive the transmission. 
Table 17.  Time Required (seconds) to Transmit the Mean Number of Bits From the Relay 
      
Rekey 
Protocol   
WSN 
Size 
Key 
Size Pair-wise Hierarchical
Secure 
Lock 
  128 0.39 0.79 0.19 
40 256 0.48 0.97 0.28 
  512 0.66 1.33 0.46 
  128 2.10 2.70 0.74 
100 256 2.57 3.31 1.22 
  512 3.53 4.55 2.18 
  128 48.28 20.65 12.28 
500 256 59.32 25.36 23.45 
  512 81.39 34.80 46.35 
  128 191.09 48.10 46.24 
1000 256 234.76 59.09 91.50 
  512 322.12 81.08 182.05 
 
 Given the time required for the transmission, the amount of battery power consumed by 
the receiving WSN nodes is calculated by multiplying the transmission time by the current 
required by the WSN node in receive mode.  Finally, the percentage of battery life savings of the 
hierarchical and Secure Lock rekey protocols over the baseline pair-wise is  
% Battery Life Savings = (pair-wise power – other power)/Total battery life * 100  (3)  
where the “other power” is power consumption for the hierarchical or Secure Lock case and the 
total battery life is 10,260 mA-secs given by 2.85 mAh * 60 min/hr * 60 sec/hr.  The percentage-
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of-battery-life-saved results are shown in Table 18.  Positive numbers reflect savings over pair-
wise, while negative numbers indicate pair-wise consumed less power.  The best performer is 
shaded grey. 
Table 18.  Percentage of Total Battery Life Saved in Comparison to Pair-wise Keying (RX) 
    Rekey Protocol 
WSN 
Size 
Key 
Size Hierarchical Secure Lock 
  128 -0.06 % 0.03 % 
40 256 -0.08 % 0.03 % 
  512 -0.10 % 0.03 %  
  128 -0.09 % 0.21 % 
100 256 -0.12 % 0.21 % 
  512 -0.16 % 0.21 % 
  128 4.31 % 5.61 % 
500 256 5.29 % 5.59 % 
  512 7.26 % 5.46 % 
  128 22.30 % 22.59 % 
1000 256 27.40 % 22.34 % 
  512 37.59 %  21.84 % 
  
 The battery power saved ranges from 0.03% to 37.59% of the batteries’ total life span by 
using a more efficient rekey protocol instead of pair-wise. 
 If a WSN node has to retransmit the rekey messages, the savings are similar.  Using the 
same approach outlined above, but with a power consumption of 17mA at the transmitting WSN 
node, Table 19 shows the same type of result as Table 18 for a WSN node transmitting at 3 dBm.  
The battery life savings in a node that transmits the rekey message ranges from 0.0333% to 
39.9385%. 
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Table 19.  Percentage of Total Battery Life Saved in Comparison to Pair-wise Keying (TX) 
    Rekey Protocol 
WSN 
Size 
Key 
Size Hierarchical Secure Lock 
  128 -0.07 % 0.03 % 
40 256 -0.08 % 0.03 % 
  512 -0.11 % 0.03 % 
  128 -0.10 % 0.22 % 
100 256 -0.12 % 0.22 % 
  512 -0.17 % 0.22 % 
  128 4.58 % 5.97 % 
500 256 5.63 % 5.94 % 
  512 7.72 % 5.81 % 
  128 23.69 % 24.00 % 
1000 256 29.11 % 23.74 % 
  512 39.94 % 23.21 % 
  
4.2.3 Memory Occupied Within the WSN Devices  
 
 Because of the limited memory in the WSN devices, the amount of memory required to 
store the keys or received message containing the keys is an important consideration.  Table 20 
presents the maximum amount of memory in bytes occupied in a WSN node during a rekey 
operation.  Each entry represents the number of bytes occupied by the newly transmitted key(s) 
or the Secure Lock message.   
 In Table 20, for a given number of rekey recipients (cluster size) and the key size in bits, 
the amount of memory in bytes is shown for each rekey protocol.  Pair-wise is the best performer 
every time, since it requires only the new SEK to be sent to each node.  The number of keys held 
by nodes under the hierarchical rekey protocol depends on the cluster size and the 
implementation within the simulation.  Secure Lock starts off reasonably close to hierarchical, 
but does not scale well [AnM08] and increases dramatically up to almost 100 times of the 
amount of memory occupied by pair-wise keying.  
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Table 20.  Memory (bytes) Occupied by Rekey Message 
      
Rekey 
Protocol   
Cluster 
Size 
Key 
Size Pair-wise Hierarchical
Secure 
Lock 
  128 16 80 64 
4 256 32 160 128 
  512 64 320 255 
  128 16 96 158 
10 256 32 192 319 
  512 64 384 639 
  128 16 128 794 
50 256 32 256 1593 
  512 64 512 3194 
  128 16 144 1587 
100 256 32 288 3188 
  512 64 576 6388 
 
 
 Table 21 reflects the same results as Table 20, but by percentage of increase over pair-
wise keying.  Secure Lock has the smallest increase over pair-wise for the smallest cluster size of 
4 nodes, corresponding to the WSN size of 40 nodes.  An improvement in the efficiency of the 
hierarchical assignment as mentioned in Section 4.2.1.3 would allow hierarchical to almost 
match (300%) or beat (200%) Secure Lock for the smallest cluster size case.  For all other cases, 
hierarchical exhibits the least increase in occupied memory, but efficiency gains can be seen here 
as well.  Each key eliminated from the hierarchical tree reduces the entries in the hierarchical 
column of Table 21 by one.  Secure Lock shows a maximum increase of 9,880% over pair-wise 
keying.  The 6.2 KB required by Secure Lock represents 4.84% of the total data memory space 
available in the Crossbow IRIS [Cro08], taking away memory for measurements or other data 
storage requirements. 
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Table 21.  Percentage of Increase in Memory Space Used Over Pair-wise Keying 
    Rekey Protocol 
Cluster 
Size 
Key 
Size Hierarchical
Secure 
Lock 
  128 400 % 297 % 
4 256 400 % 298 % 
  512 400 % 299 % 
  128 500 % 888 % 
10 256 500 % 895 % 
  512 500 % 898 % 
  128 700 % 4861 % 
50 256 700 % 4879 % 
  512 700 % 4890 % 
  128 800 % 9820 % 
100 256 800 % 9861 % 
  512 800 % 9880 % 
 
4.3 Overall Analysis 
 Analysis of all of the collected simulation data finds that the size of the WSN is the 
primary statistically-significant factor in the number of bits transmitted to rekey a WSN.  Once 
the WSN size is accounted for, the rekeying protocol is the next largest statistically-significant 
contributor.   
Comparing Secure Lock and pair-wise keying, Secure Lock provides the following 
performance gains over pair-wise keying: 
• 3.32 - 75.80% reduction of the number of bits transmitted  
• 0.03 - 22.59% reduction in WSN receiver battery power consumption  
• 0.03 - 24.00% reduction in WSN transmitter battery power consumption  
However, Secure Lock consumes 297 - 9,880% more memory than pair-wise keying. 
Comparing hierarchical and pair-wise keying, hierarchical provides the following 
performance gains when the WSN size is 500 or 1,000 nodes: 
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• 57.24 - 74.83%  reduction of the number of bits transmitted  
• 4.31 - 37.59% reduction in WSN receiver battery power consumption  
• 4.58 - 39.94% reduction in WSN transmitter battery power consumption  
However, for WSN sizes of 40 or 100 nodes, hierarchical performed worse than pair-
wise.  For all WSN sizes, hierarchical used 400 - 800% more memory than pair-wise keying. 
Even so, the security of Secure Lock is not as robust as the other keying techniques 
[AnM08], due to the way Secure Lock “locks” the rekey message.  Each participant in the 
network is assigned a unique, relatively prime number as a pre-shared secret.  The numbers are 
relatively prime to the other assigned numbers in network.  Because the field of numbers is 
reduced from all possible combinations to only the relatively prime numbers, the strength of the 
lock is not as great as other encryption methods.  Because of this, Secure Lock is more 
vulnerable to brute force attacks.   
4.4 Summary  
 This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from the Matlab simulation of three 
different rekeying protocols applied to wireless sensor networks using the Hubenko architecture.  
The validation of the simulation is presented followed by analysis of the 1440 data points 
collected in terms of bits transmitted and battery power conserved.  An overall analysis is 
presented along with several observations. 
 80
V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the research.  Section 5.1 presents the 
conclusions from the experimental results.  The significance of this research is discussed in 
Section 5.2.  Section 5.3 describes recommendations for areas of future research.  Finally, 
Section 5.4 summarizes the chapter. 
5.1 Conclusions of Research 
The following conclusions are drawn from analysis of 1,440 data points collected from 
144 distinct network simulations. 
The Hubenko architecture can be successfully applied to WSNs.  The benefit of the 
Hubenko architecture over clustering alone increases as the mobility of nodes between clusters 
increases.  Mobility does not have to be physical movement; it can also be logical movement of 
nodes as they are re-assigned to different clusters to realize higher efficiency or some operational 
effect.   
The baseline Hubenko architecture rekeying performance can be improved by using 
either Secure Lock or hierarchical rekeying.  The best choice depends on the size of the wireless 
sensor network and the size of the key used.  For small networks with shorter key lengths, Secure 
Lock performs better than hierarchical.  For larger networks with longer key lengths, hierarchical 
is the best performer.  Compared to the baseline pair-wise keying, there is a 3.32% to 75.80% 
reduction in the number of bits transmitted for rekey operations.  Table 22 summarizes the 
results, showing the best rekey protocol for each combination of WSN size and key size. 
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Table 22.  Best Rekey Protocol for given WSN size and Key Size 
    Key Size   
WSN 
Size 128 256 512 
40 Secure Lock Secure Lock Secure Lock 
100 Secure Lock Secure Lock Secure Lock 
500 Secure Lock Secure Lock Hierarchical 
1000 Secure Lock Hierarchical Hierarchical 
 
Significant battery power savings can be realized through the Secure Lock or hierarchical 
rekeying instead of pair-wise.  Compared to the baseline pair-wise keying, savings range from 
0.03% to 37.59% in receiver battery power saved and from 0.03% to 39.94% transmitter battery 
power saved. 
Secure Lock places additional resource requirements on the WSN nodes.  The additional 
memory required ranges from 297% to 9,880% over pair-wise keying.  To unlock and extract the 
new key from a Secure Lock message, the WSN node must divide the arbitrary precision number 
(which is up to 51,110 bits in this simulation) by its Secure Lock ID to obtain a remainder and 
perform a bit-wise XOR.  On the other hand, hierarchical keying’s additional memory space 
requirements range from 400% to 800% more than pair-wise keying, and hierarchical requires 
only the bit-wise XOR for the WSN node to decrypt the key. 
Based on the number of bits transmitted, the savings in battery power and the amount of 
memory space required, it is clear that hierarchical keying is the best approach for network sizes 
of 1,000 nodes or more utilizing a key with 128 bits or more in length.  For smaller network 
sizes, Secure Lock may be beneficial, but any savings over hierarchical keying are offset by the 
reduced security and the increased complexity of Secure Lock.    
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5.2 Significance of Research 
 This research provides alternatives to the baseline Hubenko architecture pair-wise 
rekeying approach that result in valuable WSN battery savings.  Since the WSN nodes’ life is 
limited by the battery lifetime, even modest savings can be important for increasing the 
operational lifetime of a WSN. 
 The application of the Hubenko architecture to WSNs is significant.  In WSNs that are 
mobile, or adapt to external conditions, the Hubenko architecture has been shown in previous 
research to reduce network rekey transmissions significantly for networks with internally mobile 
nodes [Phi08, Hub08].   
 This research is the first to apply the Hubenko architecture to WSNs.  It is also the first to 
apply the Secure Lock and hierarchical rekey protocols to the Hubenko architecture.  
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
  One area that requires additional work is the efficiency of hierarchical method.  The 
initial assignment of nodes to hierarchical trees within the clusters may be worth additional 
communications cost to improve efficiency.  Also, investigation into efficiently trimming the 
hierarchical tree as nodes depart, efficiently assigning nodes to the hierarchical tree to maximize 
efficiency may result in the hierarchical method performing better. 
Another area for additional research includes using a network simulator, such as NS2 or 
OPNET to model physical layer effects.  This would allow modeling of network retransmissions 
caused by a variety of reasons, based on the random placement of nodes within the physical 
space of the network. 
In order for Secure Lock to be used in WSNs, the WSN devices must be capable of 
unlocking the Secure Lock message.  There is no evidence that Secure Lock has been 
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implemented on WSN devices.  A Secure Lock message to rekey 100 nodes with a 512-bit key 
requires 51,100 bits [AnM08].  While this will fit into the memory of the WSN devices used in 
this research, numbers of this size far exceed the double-precision limitation of 64 bits.  One 
approach may be to implement Secure Lock with the Java Big.Integer class within TinyOS, to 
obtain the required arbitrary precision [AnM08].  
Future efforts could develop a fully defined protocol based on the Hubenko architecture 
and one rekey protocol, such as hierarchical.  The complete protocol should also handle 
unexpected occurrences, such as nodes not requesting a departure from the group, with the 
system detecting the absence and initiating a rekey automatically.  
5.4 Summary  
 This chapter presented and discussed the conclusions of this research.  The significance 
of the research is discussed as well as several recommendations for future research. 
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Appendix A.  Creation of Secure Locks 
 
This appendix describes how to create and use Secure Lock to secure messages within a 
network. 
The first step in using Secure Lock is to assign a unique, relatively prime ID number N to 
every node within the network [ChC89].  Relatively prime numbers are sets of numbers that have 
a greatest common denominator of one.  Since the pool of numbers used when assigning 
numbers is based on the number of bits of the message size used, there may be more relatively 
prime numbers for a given range than true prime numbers.  
The next step is to pick a subset, n, from all available nodes in the network that are 
authorized to properly unlock the message.  Next, for each authorized recipient, the remainder 
used by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, Ri is found through a bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) 
operation between the node’s assigned number, Ni and the message to be sent, M as shown in 
[ChC89, Kob98] where 
Ri = Ni XOR M     (A1) 
 
These remainders, Ri, are then used to create a set of equations, known as congruent 
equations, to solve for the common solution, which is the Secure Lock, X.  The set of congruent 
equations is  
X =  Ri mod Ni  for all i=1 to n  (A2) 
 
For this set of congruent equations, the common solution, X is somewhere between zero 
and M-1 where 
M = П Ni    for i=1 to n  (A3) 
 
Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem [Den82], the following steps [Kob98] show how 
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to generate the common solution, X, which is the Secure Lock [ChC89]: 
a) Compute M. 
b) For each i, compute Mi = M/Ni.  Where Ni is the prime ID of Node i 
c) For each i, find the least positive residue, Ri, of Mi modulo Ni. 
d) For all i, find the least positive yi that satisfies yiMi = 1 mod Ni. 
e) For each i, compute RiMiyi. 
f) Add all of the numbers from step (e). 
g) Find the least non-negative residue modulo M of the result from (f). This is X. 
Once computed, the Secure Lock, X, is transmitted to all nodes in the network. 
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Appendix B.  Communications Link Budget 
 
This appendix describes the link budgets between a WSN node and a communications 
relay as well as a link between the communications relay and an UAV. 
The transmission range of the WSN nodes is an important factor in the design of the 
overall network.   
 Using the Crossbow IRIS as the simulated device, the range depends on the output power 
of the IRIS, the gain of the transmitting antenna, the path loss, the gain of the receiving antenna, 
and finally, the receiver sensitivity. 
 The received power is [Ada09] 
PR = PT + GT – L + GR     (B1) 
where 
PR is the received signal power in dBm 
PT is the transmitter output power in dBm 
GT is the transmitter antenna gain in dBi 
GR is the receiver antenna gain in dBi 
L is the link loss in dB 
 
Using the IRIS’s maximum power of 3 dBm [Cro08], whip antenna gains of 0 dBi 
[Ada09], and a receiver sensitivity of -100 dBm [Cro08, Sim08], the maximum link loss allowed 
is 103 dBm. 
 The dominate loss in a link is usually path loss, Lp is a function of the transmission 
frequency, F in MHz and the distance, D between the transmitter and receiver in kilometers 
[Ada09].  
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 LP = 32.44 + 20 Log D + 20 Log F    (B2) 
Using a transmit frequency of 2.4 GHz and the maximum link loss of 103 dBm, the 
maximum distance, D is 1.41 km.    
 However, there are additional losses in the link.  The first is the normal atmospheric loss 
which varies based on the distance of the link.  Normal atmospheric attenuation is about 0.01 dB 
per km [Ada09].  The other source of loss is due to the amount of moisture in the air.  If it is 
raining heavily, the link experiences additional losses up to 0.03 dB per km.  Accounting for the 
normal atmospheric effects, D drops to 1.4 km. 
 The maximum distance of 1.4 km is the theoretical distance a link can be established 
between the transmitter and receiver.  However, a link margin of 5 dB is normally added to 
ensure the link works as expected.  Accounting for atmospheric effects and adding the link 
margin of 5 dB, the maximum theoretical distance drops to 789 meters.  The IRIS specification 
sheet indicates a maximum range in excess of 300 meters [Cro08]. 
  The maximum distance of 789 meters is not much range to establish communications 
beyond the WSN.  Unless the GACA-GKM can be placed within range of the WSN, a relay must 
be added to the network.  The relay requires a more powerful radio, which requires more battery 
power.   
 The UAVs listed in Table 3 carry the Common Data Link (CDL) radio suite, which 
provides VHF and UHF radio relay access to ground forces [OSD04].  L-3 Communications 
makes a small package (3” x 5” x 1.25”) transceiver with a 3.7 W transmitter [L3C08] that is 
suitable for ground use.  Paired with 5 dBi omni-directional antennas, the total link budget for 
equation (B1) is now 145 dBm with a transmission frequency of 15 GHz.  The theoretical range 
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of this radio link is 12.2 km or 39,650 feet accounting for all factors mentioned above except for 
rain. 
 This range allows for the relay to communicate with the MQ-1 and MQ-9 UAVs 
operating below their maximum altitude ceiling, but is still out of reach of the Global Hawk, 
which commonly operates at attitudes above 40,000 feet.  
 Once the signal reaches the UAV, the CDL suite allows for the signal to be re-broadcast 
to ground stations or up to a satellite link, which allows for the network’s GACA-GKM to be 
placed anywhere in the world. 
 While the equipment exists for this link to be formed, it is not a practical solution for an 
unattended WSN.  First, the relay must be located within the range of the WSN, with a WSN 
node physically attached to it via Ethernet cable.  While the CDL radio is small, it is still much 
larger than the WSN nodes.  Finally, the power requirements of the radio will drain the radio’s 
lithium battery [SLB05] within five hours of continuous transmission.  Even with a 10% duty 
cycle on the radio, the battery will last only 2 days, compared to the 30 day simulated life of the 
WSN nodes. 
 As described in Section 1.2, one potential application of the network architecture is a 
replacement for a field of landmines.  With the CDL communications relay(s) located on the 
friendly edge of the field, hundreds or thousands of WSN nodes can be scattered in front of the 
relays.  The nodes operate as a WSN, with the cluster leaders channeling messages to the CDL 
communications relay.  The relays can either be powered by batteries and serviced every other 
day, or powered by an external source.  Alternatively, if the WSN field is used to protect the 
perimeter of friendly installation with computer network connectivity to spare, externally 
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powered WSN gateways can be used to provide the interface between the IP network and the 
WSN field. 
 The network modeled in this research is independent of the type of communication relay 
or WSN gateway used.  This is left to the network designer for the specific application as 
required. 
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Appendix C.  Plots of Log Number of Bits Transmitted 
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Figure 29.  Plot of Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 40 
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Figure 30. Plot of Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 100 
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Figure 31. Plot of Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 500 
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Figure 32. Plot of Log Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 1000 
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Appendix D.  Plots of Mean Number of Bits Transmitted 
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Figure 33. Plot of Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 40 
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Figure 34. Plot of Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 100 
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Figure 35. Plot of Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 500 
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Figure 36. Plot of Number of Bits Transmitted for WSN Size = 1000 
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Figure 37.  Plot of Data Presented in Table 15. 
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